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rare case, some courts have approved a fee enhancement to reward the professionals.6 Other
courts however, have held that a fee enhancement is permissible when the fees sought by a
professional under the traditional “reasonable compensation” calculation are less than what a
professional practicing outside of bankruptcy would have received in addition to requiring “rare
and exceptional” circumstances.7 Moreover, some courts have departed from the above standards
and have formulated their own unique analysis.8
This Article is separated into three parts that discuss the methods that courts use when
determining whether to approve a professionals’ proposed fees, including a proposed fee
enhancement. Part I discusses the traditional methods of determining whether the proposed
compensation is reasonable under section 330. Part II discusses the requirements for granting fee
enhancements. In particular, Part II discusses the case law that addressed whether to approve a
fee enhancement. Finally, Part III concludes by examining the practical implications of these
courts’ requirements for granting a fee enhancement in bankruptcy cases.
I.

Determining Whether a Professional’s Proposed Compensation is “Reasonable”
under Section 330

This section discusses reasonable compensation generally under section 330. It also
discusses other factors consider by the courts in determining reasonable compensation.
Because section 330 provides a non-exclusive list of factors for the court to consider, many
bankruptcy courts have determined the reasonableness of the proposed compensation by
considering a combination of the factors included in the statute, the lodestar analysis and the

6

See, e.g., In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 18 B.R. 834, 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir.) cert. granted sub nom. Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO,
L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). In this case the Supreme Court also granted certiorari on the issue of whether a
professional is entitled to receive compensation for defending its fee application. However, this Article will not
discuss that issue; see also Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d 207, 210 (7th Cir. 1993).
8
Matter of First Am. Health Care of Georgia, Inc., 212 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997).
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Johnson Factors.9 First, courts calculate the fees using the lodestar method, which is discussed
below.10 After applying the lodestar analysis, the court may exercise its discretion to adjust the
lodestar fee upward or downward based on the courts consideration of the factors listed in
section 330 and the Johnson Factors, which are also discussed below.11
a. The “Lodestar” Method
Relying on cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act12, bankruptcy courts first apply the
“lodestar” method for determining whether the proposed compensation is reasonable.13 The
lodestar method involves a two-step analysis.14 First, the court will determine the number of
hours that the professional expended for actual and necessary services.15 Then the court will
multiply the number of reasonable hours by an appropriate billing rate, 16 usually the prevailing
hourly rate in the community for similar work.17 While courts first applied the lodestar method in
cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act, courts have continued to apply that the lodestar method
as part of its “reasonable compensation” determination under the Bankruptcy Code.18 For
example, in In re Boddy19, the court rejected the application of a maximum fixed fee and applied
the lodestar method.20 In doing so, the Boddy court emphasized that the Supreme Court indicated
that federal courts should use the lodestar method to determine whether attorney fees are

9

See In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 295; see also In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir.
2012), as revised (Aug. 14, 2012).
10
Infra Part I.A.; see also In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 656.
11
Infra Part I.B; Infra Part I.C.; see also In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 656.
12
E.g., Matter of Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207, 1211 (5th Cir. 1987).
13
See Id. at 1211; see also In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 655.
14
Collier on Bankruptcy Colliers ¶ [330.03] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somme reds., 16th ed. 2014), available at
LEXIS, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P 330.03.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
E.g., In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 655.
18
In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991).
19
Id.
20
Id.
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reasonable under federal statutes that provide for such fees.21 Moreover, the Boddy court noted
that courts generally rely on the lodestar method in bankruptcy cases.22 Therefore, the Boddy
court held that since the Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute that provides for judicial review of
proposed professional fees, such fees should be analyzed under the lodestar method.23
However, the courts analysis does not end with the lodestar method, as the court will then
determine to enhance or reduce the proposed fee.24 Reductions are usually made where the
attorney’s services were of little to no benefit to the estate while factors used for enhancement
are discussed below.25
b. Factors Under Section 330
Section 330 requires that a bankruptcy court review a professional’s proposed compensation
and determine whether the compensation is reasonable for actual and necessary services
provided by the professional.26 The Bankruptcy Code provides guidance to bankruptcy courts
considering whether the proposed compensation is reasonable.27 In particular, section 330
provides a non-exclusive list of factors for a bankruptcy court to consider when making such
determination, providing in pertinent part that:
the court shall consider the nature, the extent and the value of such services, taking into
account all relevant factors including… (A) the time spent on such services; (B) the rates
charged for such services; (C) whether the services were necessary to the administration
of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a
case under this title; (D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable about
of time commensurate with the complexity, importance and nature of the problem, issue,
or task addressed; (E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board
certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and

21

Id.
Id.
23
Id.
24
11 U.S.C. §330(a)(4)(A) (2012).
25
In re J. V. Knitting Serv., Inc., 22 B.R. 543, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
26
11 U.S.C. §330 (2012).
27
Id.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439
22

4

(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary comparably skilled
practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.28
The weight given to each factor in section 330 rests within the broad discretion of the court
and because section 330(a) is non-exclusive the court may also take non-listed factors into
account.29
c. The Johnson Factors
In cases decided under both the Bankruptcy Act30 and the Bankruptcy Code31, bankruptcy
courts have held that they retain the discretion to adjust the fees calculated under the lodestar
method upwards or downwards.32 In exercising such discretion, the courts will consider the
Johnson Factors.33
The Johnson Factors for determining whether to adjust the professional fee calculated under
the lodestar method include:
(1) The time and labor required;
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by the case;
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of a case;
(5) The customary fee for similar work in the community;
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) Time pressures imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) The amount involved and results obtained as a result of the attorneys’ services;
(9) The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the desirability of the case;
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) Awards in similar cases.34

28

Id.
In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 294.
30
Nelson Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, invalidated by
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §§101-1532.
31
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012)
32
In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 655 (citing to Lawler a pre-Bankruptcy Code case and applying the
reasoning to a case governed by the Bankruptcy Code).
33
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d at 714.
34
Id. at 717-719.
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The Johnson Factors were first extended to bankruptcy in In re First Colonial Corp. of
America,35 which was decided under the Bankruptcy Act. The First Colonial court held that
although derived in a non-bankruptcy case, the Johnson Factors were equally useful in
determining whether the proposed compensation was reasonable under the Bankruptcy Act,
which authorized such compensation.36
Although Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act and replaced it with the Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy courts continue to apply the Johnson Factors.37 Some courts, such as the court in
Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co.,38 have suggested that each Johnson Factor be
considered in light of the other surrounding circumstances and urge the bankruptcy judge to
strike a “genuine balance.” Other courts, such as the court in In re El Paso Refinery, L.P,39 have
suggested giving the most weight to four of the Johnson Factors (novelty and complexity of the
issues, the skill and experience of the counsel, the quality of the services rendered, and the
results obtained) because these are most consistent with the statute and lodestar analysis.40
These courts note that the other eight Johnson Factors are given less weight because these factors
have little relevance in bankruptcy cases.41
II.

Fee Enhancement Authorization

When enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended for section 330 to depart from
doctrines that strictly limited fee awards under the Bankruptcy Act. 42 This departure sought to
ensure that the compensation in bankruptcy matters is commensurate to the fees awarded for

35

Matter of First Colonial Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d at 1299.
Id.
37
See, e.g., In re Lan Associates XI, L.P., 192 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Moreover, in spite of the factors
enumerated in § 330, many courts continue to employ the twelve factors set forth”).
38
Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 879 (11th Cir. 1990).
39
In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 257 B.R. 809, 826 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d 207, 208 (7th Cir. 1993).
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comparable services in non-bankruptcy cases. 43 Accordingly, section 330 grants bankruptcy
courts broad discretion to determine attorney’s fees, as they are most familiar with the services
rendered. 44
Furthermore, since four of the Johnson Factors are subsumed into the lodestar calculation,
these four factors may only form the basis of an adjustment in “rare and exceptional” cases.45
The power to grant fee enhancement generally derives from precedent set by the Supreme
Court.46 In Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn47, a non-bankruptcy case, the Supreme Court held
that “enhancements may be awarded in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ circumstances”, citing to a long
line of precedent.
Similarly, bankruptcy courts have also relied on its own precedents in justifying its ability to
grant fee enhancements. As pointed out in In re Pilgrims Pride, the Fifth Circuit stated “we have
consistently held that bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to adjust the lodestar upwards or
downwards when awarding reasonable compensation to professionals…”48 In re Pilgrims Pride
also relied on a long line of precedent, citing to multiple cases such as Rose Pass Mines and
Lawler.49
a. Cases Granting Fee Enhancements

43

Id. at 209.
In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 294.
45
Id.
46
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 571-72 (2010) (“Our prior cases make clear that enhancements
are permitted in “ ‘exceptional’ cases,”).
47
Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986); Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896–901(1984)).
48
In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 660.
49
Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1980); Matter of Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1987).
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In determining whether a fee enhancement is proper, bankruptcy courts have followed the
Supreme Court’s ruling Blum v. Stenson 50, a non-bankruptcy case. In Blum v. Stenson, the
Supreme Court held that where a statute governs the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, a fee
enhancement is only appropriate in “rare case[s] where the…applicant offers specific evidence
show[ing] that the quality of service…was superior…and that the success was ‘exceptional.’”51
Bankruptcy courts have consistently held that fee enhancement are only warranted in “rare
and exceptional” circumstances.52 Yet, bankruptcy courts have inconsistently applied this
standard when reviewing proposed fee enhancements.53
For example, in In re Apex Oil Co 54, the Eighth Circuit determined that despite the fact that
the lodestar calculation already accounted for novelty and complexity of the case, the experience
and special skill of counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained; fee
enhancements are permissible in “rare and exceptional” cases.55 To obtain a fee enhancement,
the Eight Circuit concluded that the applicant must also demonstrate “that the quality of the
service rendered and results obtained were superior to what one should expect in light of the
hourly rate charged and the number of hours expended.”56
In Apex Oil, the bankruptcy court determined that the quality of the examiners service was of
exceptional quality and yielded exceptional results.57 The examiner engineered a settlement,

50

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899 (1984); see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) supplemented, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
51
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 899; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. at 565.
52
In re Apex Oil Co.,960 F.2d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 1992); In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 294.
53
Compare In re Apex Oil Co., 960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding that a fee enhancement for superior service is
permissible even where it has been accounted for in the lodestar calculation) with Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986
F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a fee enhancement for exceptional service is barred where the lodestar
calculation has accounted for this).
54
In re Apex Oil Co.,960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
55
Id. at 731-732.
56
Id. at 732.
57
Id.
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which permitted Apex to avoid expensive protracted litigation that could have destroyed any
chance of reorganization.58 Further, the examiner developed a procedure for handling hundreds
of personal injury suits against Apex, protecting Apex from a potential drain of its resources.59
Moreover, the examiner obtained court approval for an asset sale, which gave Apex the chance
to satisfy secured creditors as well as preserve value for its unsecured creditors.60
The Eighth Circuit in Apex Oil held that the bankruptcy courts standard of allowing fee
enhancements in “rare and exceptional” circumstances was correct and remanded to the lower
court for further fact finding to determine if the services rendered and results obtained were
superior to what one would expect at the hourly rate charged.61
Further, in In re Asarco, the Fifth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in authorizing fee enhancements to two law firms representing a chapter 11 debtor in
connection with their remarkably successful fraudulent transfer litigation.62 In In re Asarco,
Baker Botts L.L.P. (“Baker Botts”) and Jordan, Hyden, Womble, Culbreth & Holzer, P.C.
(“Jordan Hyden”) served as debtor’s counsel and helped the debtor confirm a plan that paid
creditors in full.63 In connection with that representation, Baker Botts and Jorden Hyden
successfully prosecuted complex fraudulent transfer claims against the debtor’s parent
corporation resulting in an unprecedented judgment valued at between $7 and $10 billion.64
While Baker Botts and Jordan Hyden were compensated pursuant to section 330(a), the
bankruptcy court authorized a twenty percent fee enhancement for Baker Botts and a ten percent

58

Id. at 730.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299.
63
Id. at 296.
64
Id. at 293.
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fee enhancement for Jordan Hyden.65 The bankruptcy court based the authorization of the fee
enhancements on the “rare and exceptional” performance of the firms in successfully prosecuting
the multi-billion dollar fraudulent conveyance action and the fact that the rates charged by Baker
Botts and Jordan Hyden were roughly twenty percent and ten percent, respectively, below
market rate.66 While the below market rates charged by the two firms was a factor in awarding
fee enhancements, the court emphasized that the “once in a lifetime” result in the fraudulent
conveyance action that resulted in the creditors being paid in full was the driving force behind
the fee enhancement.67
b. Cases Denying Fee Enhancement
Currently, no bankruptcy court has held that a fee enhancement is never permissible. While
recognizing that fee enhancements are theoretically permissible, some courts have denied
applications for fee enhancements.
For example, in Matter of UNR Industries, the Seventh Circuit upheld the lower courts’
decision denying chapter 11 debtor’s attorney’s request for a fee enhancement.68 In UNR,
Schwartz, Cooper, Kolb and Graynor (“Schwartz Cooper”) devised an innovative use of
bankruptcy in a mass tort case relating to asbestos lawsuits.69 In particular, Schwartz Cooper
advised their client to file for bankruptcy under chapter 11, which resulted in the bankruptcy
court approving a fund that included ninety-two percent of the debtor’s common stock that was

65

Id. at 294.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d at 207.
69
Id. at 208.
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to be used for the benefit of its creditors70. The bankruptcy court described this approach as
“ingenious.”71
Schwartz Cooper received more than $3.2 million in legal fees in connection with its
representation of the debtor.72 Believing that representation was so superior, Schwartz Cooper
requested a twenty-five percent fee enhancement.73 The bankruptcy court, however, denied this
request because the court determined that the fees already received by the firm were fair and
reasonable.74 The district court affirmed on the same grounds.75 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the lower courts’ decision, agreeing that a fee enhancement was not permitted because
the compensation received was already reasonable.76
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that in enacting section 330, Congress
intended to ensure that bankruptcy attorneys are compensated at the same rate as those outside of
bankruptcy in order to encourage talented attorneys to take bankruptcy cases.77 The Seventh
Circuit also emphasized that non-bankruptcy attorneys bill at an hourly rate and do not regularly
receive a fee enhancement for exceptionally representing their clients.78 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that novelty and complexity of the case, the experience and special skill of
counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained, were already taken into account
as part of the lodestar calculation.79 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that when a fee
enhancement is sought for exceptional quality it is only appropriate where such circumstances

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 209.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 210.
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were not taken into account in lodestar calculation, making the initial rate charged a below
market rate.80
Turning to the facts of the case, the Seventh Circuit determined that although Schwartz
Cooper provided superior service, the bankruptcy court already accounted for superior service as
part of the the lodestar calculation.81 The Seventh Circuit however did not address what exactly
would qualify as a “rare and exceptional” circumstance that would permit a court to approve a
fee enhancement.82 As a result, while the UNR court alluded that an attorney might be granted a
fee enhancement for simply charging below market rates, it is still unclear when an attorney will
be entitled to a fee enhancement based on exceptional work in the Seventh Circuit.83
Similarly, in Matter of First American Health Care of Georgia,84 the bankruptcy court also
denied a chapter 11 debtors’ attorney’s request for a fee enhancement.85 However, this
bankruptcy court based its denial on its own formulation.86 In First American, the court
analyzed cases in which bankruptcy courts have granted fee enhancements and determined that
in each case one of the following factors were present:
(1) unique and unforeseen obstacles which were not anticipated at the time the case was retained;
or (2) results which far exceeded reasonable expectations at the outset of the case or (3) consent
by the party paying the fee enhancement at the time of application or by contractual agreement.87
The First American court determined that none of those factors were present.88 In particular,
the debtor attorneys faced no obstacles that were unique or unforeseen at the time the attorneys

80

Id at 211.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id at 210.
84
Matter of First Am. Health Care of Georgia, Inc., 212 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 416.
88
Id. at 417.
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were retained.89 Next, the First American court determined that the results obtained by the
debtors’ attorneys could have also been achieved by other attorneys of like background who
charge a similar rate of compensation.90 Last, there was no consent or contractual agreement by
the party responsible to pay such enhancement.91 Because none of these factors were present, the
First American court denied the fee enhancement.92 This case further illuminates the
inconsistency in the authorization or denial of fee enhancements.
III.

Implications of Fee Enhancement Case Law

An attorney should not go into a case expecting a fee enhancement due to the varying and
inconsistent approaches taken by the various courts. A practitioner may be compelled to charge
lower rates and thus receive an “enhancement” under the reasoning of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuit’s in Asarco and UNR respectively, where a showing of below market rates was required
in addition to exceptional service. However, while fee enhancements are permissible, courts are
in general consensus as to how rare authorizations of such enhancements are.93 Moreover, while
the Fifth Circuit’s decision required evidence of below market rates, the Fifth Circuit seemed to
uphold the fee enhancements based more on the “once in a lifetime result”94 obtained by the two
firms in the bankruptcy litigation than it was on the fact that the firms charged below-market
rates, while the Seventh Circuit based its decision more so on below market rates.95 Further,
courts have still been unable to formulate a single test or standard for determining what exactly
qualifies as “rare and exceptional.”96 This standard is seemingly extremely fact specific and up

89

Id.
Id. at 418.
91
Id.
92
Id at 417.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299; see also Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d at 207.
96
See In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299; see also Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d at 207.; see also In re
Apex Oil Co.,960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
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to each individual bankruptcy court. What qualifies as “rare and exceptional” in the eyes of one
court may differ from that of another.
Accordingly, a law firm should not undercut its rates when seeking to represent a debtor or
committee solely with the hopes of receiving a fee enhancement for the mere fact that it charged
below market rates. This is not to say that there are not reasons for a law firm to charge belowmarket rates. Law firms are currently faced with more competition for few cases because as with
all bankruptcy filings, the number of business chapter 11 filings have decreased recently.97 As a
result, a law firm may want to undercut the prevailing market rates, which may already be facing
downward pressure because of this increased competition for representations, in order to get
retained in the first place.
Conclusion
Under section 330, professional fees are calculated by taking certain factors into account
such as: time spent on the services, the rates charges for the services, the necessity of the
services, the complexity of the questions involved, the skill and experience of the professional
and the rate charged in comparison to compensation charged by comparable practitioners outside
of bankruptcy.98 Additionally, courts also analyze the proposed fees by applying the lodestar
method and the Johnson Factors.99
Furthermore, courts also have the ability to adjust the professional fee upward, resulting in a
fee enhancement.100 In determining if a professional is entitled to a fee enhancement the courts
have applied two general approaches; (1) awarding enhancements in “rare and exceptional”

97

UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-bankruptcy-courts.aspx
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (Table 7 depicting a 9.7% decrease in chapter 11 cases filed from 2009- 2013).
98
11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).
99
Matter of First Colonial Corp. of Am., 544 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977) (adopting the Johnson factors);
Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1983) (adopting the lodestar method).
100
See, e.g., In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d at 656.
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circumstances101 and (2) “rare and exceptional” circumstances plus below market rates102.
Moreover, some courts deviate from these general standards and formulate their own test,
however, these seem to be outliers.103
While there are two general approaches to fee enhancement analysis and while bankruptcy
courts generally agree that at lease one element of fee enhancement is “rare and exceptional”
circumstances, there is still a great amount of variation on what exactly qualifies as “rare and
exceptional”. So long as bankruptcy courts are granted the broad discretion to grant or deny fee
enhancements, it appears that this trend of ambiguity will continue and each court will apply its
own individual analysis on a case by case basis rather than bankruptcy courts adopting an
overarching clear cut definition of what exactly is “rare and exceptional.”

101

In re Apex Oil Co.,960 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299
103
Matter of First Am. Health Care of Georgia, Inc., 212 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997).
102
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